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WORDS THAT DENY, DEVALUE, AND PUNISH:
JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO FETUS-ENVY?
SHERRY F. COLB*
"As regards little girls, we can say of them that they feel greatly at a
disadvantage owing to their lack of a big, visible penis, that they envy boys
for possessing one."'
These are the immortal words of Sigmund Freud. He believed that the
biological disparity between men and women should inspire envy for the
great male organ. Although the capacity for pregnancy and birth can be
gratifying for women, it was to Freud only a consolation prize: "In other
women, we find no evidence of this wish for a penis; it is replaced by the
wish for a baby .... It looks as if such women had understood ... that
nature has given babies to women as a substitute for the penis that has been
denied them."2
Dr. Freud's view appears quite counterintuitive, at least to many women.
Women in our male-dominated society may well envy men for a variety of
things, but it is hardly evident why the possession of a penis should be one of
them. Indeed, rather than perceiving penis-envy, Dr. Freud himself may
have experienced envy for a woman's impressive capacity to become preg-
nant and to carry out the transformation of a zygote into a baby inside her
body. I refer to this envy of women's unique reproductive capacity as
"fetus-envy."
3
* Law Clerk to Judge Wilfred Feinberg of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable contributions of
Michael C. Dorf and Nomi Stolzenberg. Thanks are due also to Erwin Chemerinsky,
Richard Craswell, Richard Parker and Elyn Saks.
1 SIGMUND FREUD, INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 318 (James
Strachey ed. & trans., 1966).
2 17 SIGMUND FREUD, THE STANDARD EDITION OF COMPLETE WORKS OF
SIGMUND FREUD 129 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1955).
3 Several psychoanalytic theorists have identified this male phenomenon, which they
have labeled "womb-envy." See, e.g., Karen Homey, The Flight from Womanhood, in
FEMININE PSYCHOLOGY 54, 60-61 (Harold Kelman ed., 1967) ("When one begins, as I
did, to analyse men only after a fairly long experience of analysing women, one receives a
most surprising impression of the intensity of this envy of pregnancy, childbirth, and
motherhood, as well as of the breasts and of the act of suckling."), quoted in JANET
SAYERS, MOTHERS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 100 (1991); Eva F. Kittay, Rereading Freud on
"Femininity" or Why Not Womb Envy?, 7 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 385 (1984)
(explaining that traditional psychoanalytic theory has never embraced the concept of
womb-envy because, given Freud's androcentric conception of femininity, the idea of
womb-envy would be incoherent); Betty Yorburg, Psychoanalysis and Women's
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This Article does not defend fetus-envy as such but instead analyzes what
might be considered its manifestation in judicial rhetoric. The Article
focuses on the ways in which judicial rhetoric perpetuates disempowering
images of women and therefore, indirectly, gender discrimination itself. By
concentrating on three cases involving human reproduction, this Article
identifies several common rhetorical devices that judges deploy-perhaps
unconsciously-to enforce male hegemony.4
Liberation, 61 PSYCHOANALYTIC REV. 71, 73-74 (1974) (describing the psychological
theories of penis-envy and womb-envy in light of the social context of the women's
liberation movement, and identifying the ideological underpinnings driving penis-envy).
I choose to label the phenomenon "fetus-envy" rather than "womb-envy" because the
former term better captures the ultimate reason for the emotion: a woman's ability to
develop a fetus inside her body.
4 In analyzing judicial rhetoric, this Article does not focus primarily on the results of
particular cases. There is not-nor would one expect there to be-a consensus among
feminists on the correct result in every case. See, e.g., California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (holding that California may afford special treatment to
pregnant employees consistent with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended to Title
VII), construed in MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 58 (1990)
(describing the divided opinions held by women's groups on whether to treat pregnant
women like men or whether to recognize their special status); see also Frances Olsen, The
Sex of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 453-67 (David Kairys ed., 1990) (describing the
variety of feminist positions); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence:
An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1384-88 (1986) (same); Robin West, Jurisprudence and
Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 58-59 (1988) (same). Acknowledging this lack of
consensus, however, is not inconsistent with Catharine MacKinnon's view that, despite
the disagreements, there are not many feminisms, but only one. See CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 22 (1987). As Christine Littleton elaborated in
her review of MacKinnon's Feminism Unmodified, this one feminism is not defined by
any particular agenda or substantive program, but is instead a distinct methodology. See
Christine A. Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 751, 752-54 (1989) (book review). The central feature of this methodology is the
commitment to valuing women's viewpoints-to seeing the world through women's eyes.
Moreover, this Article rejects the implicit message of "cultural feminists" that
supposedly feminine values-nurturing, relationship, passion-represent the true
expression of womanhood. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
Rather, the Article adopts the position of MacKinnon and Alcoff that women should
receive credit for the strengths and attributes that they have developed under a system of
oppression, but that we should not assume that we know how women would sound if they
could speak outside of the context of male supremacy. See Linda Alcoff, Cultural
Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory, 13 SIGNS
405, 414 (1988); see also Symposium, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A
Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11, 75 (1985) (discussing the merits of giving women
credit for their own accomplishments, whether or not these accomplishments were
derived from a male-dominated society). The position articulated by Robin West
provides a persuasive middle ground between cultural and radical feminism. See West,
supra, at 70-72 (asserting that, culturally and biologically, women's connections to others
differ from men's because of pregnancy and intercourse, and that a political philosophy of
[Vol. 72:101
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I. THE THREAT TO MEN AND THE MALE RESPONSE
Given the present state of reproductive technology, men and women play
undeniably unequal roles in reproduction. Once a man has contributed
genetic material, his biological task is essentially complete. In contrast, a
woman's biological role does not end after her genetic contribution. She also
gestates the developing fetus for approximately nine months, after which she
gives birth to the baby she has carried. Women's greater part in reproduc-
tion may threaten and inspire envy in men who wish to view their contribu-
tion as qualitatively and quantitatively equal to or greater than that of
women.
A second potential threat to men arises from the first: absent technologi-
cal intervention, women can determine with certainty who their children
are, while men cannot. Because most of the reproductive process takes place
inside a woman, she knows that she has mothered her own child when she
has given birth. Similarly, absent her knowledge and participation, a woman
cannot be a mother.5 A man, on the other hand, may be unaware that he
has fathered children. Conversely, he may believe that a woman is pregnant
liberal individualism is not authentic to women's experience); see also Katharine T.
Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 296-97 (1988) [hereinafter
Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood]; Mari J. Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and
Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16
N.M. L. REV. 613 (1986) (criticizing Rawls's choice of abstraction as a method of inquiry
and advocating methodologies that encompass concrete realities).
Finally, this Article takes the view that women's subjectivity challenges not some pre-
existing objectivity, but rather the dogma of male subjectivity. See MACKINNON, supra,
at 65 (asserting that the claimed objective stance in our society is an expression of male
subjectivity and that social institutions generally reflect a de facto white male affirmative
action program); see also Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the
Equal Treatment! Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325,
346 (1984-85) (arguing for a gender-neutral approach to sex discrimination, yet
criticizing decisions like Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), for making "man the
standard . . . and measur[ing] women against that standard"). But see Scott Brewer,
Pragmatism, Oppression, and the Flight to Substance, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1753, 1756
(1990) (arguing that because members of oppressed groups sometimes lack an
understanding of their circumstances-i.e., they have false consciousness-a listener
must first evaluate the merits of a speaker's "oppressed perspective," its substance, before
deferring to what the speaker says, and that, therefore, no speaker's perspective should
receive special deference in setting policy).
This Article employs the methodology of feminism that includes women's experiences
of reality in the formation, interpretation, development, and enforcement of legal rules.
See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 831 (1990)
[hereinafter Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods] (discussing three feminist methods of
"doing law," one of which is testing legal principles against actual experience in the
world).
I Although new ova removal technologies complicate this picture, they affect a very
minor percentage of overall pregnancies. Cf. SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH 29 (1981)
(reporting that American women between the ages of 30 and 40 face only a 13.6%
1992]
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with his child when in fact she is not.' This Article outlines several instances
in which judicial rhetoric diminishes the unique and powerful role that
women play in reproduction, and suggests that this rhetoric is a response to
these two threats.7
In case law, as in our culture generally, the male eye observes the world
and describes its contents-in much the same way as Dr. Freud, still the
most celebrated psychological theorist, described psychological phenomena
from a characteristically male viewpoint.8 "Women's viewpoints," on the
other hand, "have been submerged, oppressed, invisible and voiceless." 9
This suppression of women's perspectives appears not only when courts
rationalize patently sexist results, such as excluding women from legal prac-
tice,'0 but also in the rhetoric that exists independently of, and is not neces-
sary to, the holdings. Such rhetoric typically can be found in those parts of
opinions that judges label "The Facts." In these discussions-or medita-
tions on the world-judges strive for the appearance of gender neutrality.
They reinforce the neutral appearance with terms such as "natural" and
"scientific." But, as this Article will demonstrate, the meditation has a gen-
der, and its gender is male.
The rhetoric of such purportedly neutral discussions subtly influences our
thinking." Rhetoric paints a picture of the world which readers internalize
infertility rate, suggesting that the majority of women conceive without the aid of in vitro
fertilization).
I See Majorie M. Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An
Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 297, 306 (asserting that "the
physiology of procreation gives the mother opportunities to frustrate a father's
knowledge and choices about procreation").
I This Article does not attempt to prove conclusively that this judicial rhetoric results
from the psychological phenomenon of fetus-envy. Rather, the Article focuses on the
subtle effects of the rhetoric through the lens of this possible explanation for its
manifestation.
8 See SAYERS, supra note 3, at 95 (referring to Karen Homey, who "cited sociologist
Georg Simmel's observations on the way men in male-dominated society falsely but
successfully pass off their subjective experience as objective truth" and who "claimed
(that] Freud's ideas about women's psychology were no different from the subjective
response of the little boy on first discovering that girls do not have a penis").
I Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our
Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1906 (1988); see also MACKINNON, supra note 4, at 50
(asserting that "the male point of view has forced itself upon the world, and does force
itself upon the world, as its way of knowing").
10 See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring)
(upholding an Illinois statute prohibiting women from practicing law, and stating, "The
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil [sic] the noble and benign offices of
wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.").
11 For more about the significance of rhetoric in the law, see, e.g., JAMES B. WHITE,
HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW at xi-xii
(1985) ("The law can best be understood and practiced when one comes to see that its
language is not conceptual or theoretical.., but.., complex, many voiced, associative
[Vol. 72:101
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and act upon. When legal actors read rhetoric, their actions translate the
rhetoric into law, thereby profoundly influencing society at large. As Katha-
rine Bartlett has observed, the law's rhetoric also has "indirect effects on our
modes of expression, our perceptions of ourselves, and our relationships with
others. ' The understandings and visions of women and their lives implicit
in legal opinions can therefore shape the way women are perceived, by them-
selves and by men, and ultimately influence the way they are treated. Like
Bartlett, I am "concerned less with the results of any particular law-who
wins a dispute-than with the structure and expressive meaning of the
law."13
The following sections of this Article will identify several rhetorical mech-
anisms used by judges to diminish women's important reproductive role.
Although the Article poses the possibility that this phenomenon constitutes
the male response to fetus-envy, one need not accept this as true to recognize
that these rhetorical mechanisms operate subtly to disempower women.
II. RHETORICAL MECHANISMS
A. Nature and Science in Support of Sexism
The word "natural" has two distinct connotations, both of which have
been instrumental in rationalizing sexism. In one sense, natural means pre-
social or part of the inevitable order of the world. Labeling an institution
natural inherently involves an assertion that the law has not produced the
institution-that it exists externally and independently and is susceptible to
objective observation. But natural has a second meaning as well. Labeling
something natural also expresses approval for that thing. For example, it is
"natural" to feel rage at an unfaithful spouse. Such anger is considered
righteous and appropriate. The identification of the two meanings of natu-
ral-of what is with what ought to be-has existed in Western culture at
least since Aristotle's time.14 Thus, when a judge calls an instance of ine-
and deeply metaphorical in nature."). The late Professor Frug stated the issue
compellingly:
Identifying the gendered character of ... discourses can therefore be a feminist
strategy for challenging the extensive and complicated network of social and cultural
practices which legitimate the subordination of women. The assumption underlying
this strategy is that language is a mechanism of power, that there is always more at
stake in the relationship of gender and language than "just" a question of literary
style-indeed, that style itself can constitute a powerful socializing apparatus.
Mary Joe Frug, Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist Analysis of Con-
tract Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1029, 1031 (1992).
12 Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, supra note 4, at 293.
13 Id. at 294-95.
14 See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICs 67 (Thomas A. Sinclair trans., rev. ed. 1981)
("[W]hether or not it is a... better thing for one man to be a slave to another, or whether
all slavery is contrary to nature-these are the questions which must be considered.").
1992]
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quality natural, the judge may mean both to absolve the law of responsibility
for creating that inequality and to express approval of the inequality.
Courts similarly invoke the authority of science in support of sexism.
While nature's authority lies in describing culturally contingent events as
positive expressions of our essence, science's power lies in its status as an
objective truth observer, translating controversial philosophical propositions
about the world into neutral facts. As Katharine Bartlett contended with
reference to "best interests of the child" determinations in custody battles,
"[a]lthough we often pretend otherwise, it seems clear that our judgments
about what is best for children are as much the result of political and social
judgments about what kind of society we prefer as they are conclusions
based upon neutral or scientific data."' 5
The concepts of nature and science complement each other in construct-
ing an objectively verifiable and inevitable sexist world. Science allows
judges to declare that their viewpoint represents an objective description of
reality. Nature allows them to claim that this so-called objective reality is
both inevitable and appropriate.
B. Denial, Devaluation, and Punishment
The science and nature rhetorical devices frequently appear in support of
three other mechanisms: denial, devaluation, and punishment. The first
mechanism denies the features of women's reproductive capacity that men
do not share, such as pregnancy. To the extent that fetus-envy motivates
such rhetoric, denial renders women's experience invisible, thereby alleviat-
ing the anxiety caused by the threat of women's reproductive role. The sec-
ond mechanism devalues women's unique reproductive characteristics,
rendering their special capacities a mark of inferiority. This devaluation can
function to diminish the threat of women's reproductive role by reassuring
the threatened male that his inability to do what women can do makes him
superior. The third mechanism uses women's special reproductive role as a
basis for subjugation and control, and punishes women for their unique abil-
ity. The threatened male can thereby take revenge upon women for posing
the threat. The rhetoric is punitive in the sense that its tone is hostile. Thus,
for example, punishment rhetoric has little tolerance for women who do not
conform to the stereotype of "homemaker," a status of financial and social
powerlessness relative to men."8 The rhetoric also can be punitive in a more
15 Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, supra note 4, at 303.
16 This type of rhetoric has a long pedigree. For example, in State v. Hunter, 300 P.2d
455, 458 (1956), the Supreme Court of Oregon stated,
Obviously it [the legislature] intended that there should be at least one island on the
sea of life reserved for man that would be impregnable to the assault of woman. It
had watched her emerge from long tresses and demure ways to bobbed hair and
almost complete sophistication .... She had already invaded practically every
activity formerly considered suitable and appropriate for men only .... In these
circumstances, is it any wonder that the legislative assembly took advantage of the
[Vol. 72:101
HeinOnline -- 72 B.U. L. Rev. 106 1992
FETUS-ENVY
direct and active sense: judges often identify the biological differences
between women and men as justifying decisions limiting women's rights.
Three relatively recent cases, all concerning parenthood, contain examples
of this debilitating rhetoric. First, in Michael H. v. Gerald D. ,1" the United
States Supreme Court upheld the California presumption of paternity. Sec-
ond, in Davis v. Davis,i" a Tennessee trial court awarded frozen embryos to
the woman who had contributed her ova, but the state appellate court
awarded the embryos jointly to the woman and the man who conceived
them. Third, in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. ,"9 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld, but the
Supreme Court subsequently struck down, a battery company's "fetal pro-
tection policy." Each of these cases betrays several of the five rhetorical
mechanisms through which men' sometimes deal with reproductive differ-
ences and the possible threat that these differences pose.
III. NATURAL FATHERS AND UNNATURAL RULES
And the rib, which the Lord God had taken from the man, made He a
woman, and brought her unto the man. And Adam said, This is now
bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh: . . .she was taken out of
Man.
2
police power of the state in its decision to halt this ever-increasing feminine
encroachment upon what for ages had been considered strictly as manly arts and
privileges?
The court's decision upheld a statute prohibiting female wrestling.
Additionally, in Joyner v. Joyner, 59 N.C. (6 Jones Eq.) 322, 325 (1862), the Supreme
Court of North Carolina stated,
The wife must be subject to her husband. Every man must govern his household,
and if by reason of an unruly temper, or an unbridled tongue, the wife persistently
treats her husband with disrespect, and he submits to it, he not only loses all sense of
self-respect, but loses the respect of the other members of his family .... Such have
been the incidents of the marriage relation from the beginning of the human race.
Unto the woman it is said, "Thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule
over thee," Genesis chap. 3, v. 16. It follows that the law gives the husband power
to use such degree of force as is necessary to make the wife behave herself and know
her place.
The Joyner court held that a man's horsewhipping of his wife does not constitute grounds
for divorce.
17 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
18 No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989) ("Davis 1"),
rev'd, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990) ("Davis 2"),
appeal granted, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 466 (Tenn. Dec. 3, 1990) (per curiam).
19 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
20 The authors of these opinions are male. Though other judges may join in an
opinion, it does not necessarily follow that these judges adopt the author's rhetoric.
When a judge agrees with the result reached and the basic argument, she will generally
not be inclined to concur separately, even if she would have omitted some of the language
if the opinion were her own.
21 Genesis 2:22-23 (King James).
1992]
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The events preceding the trial of Michael H. v. Gerald D. 22 began when a
married woman, Carole, committed adultery and conceived a child, Victo-
ria, with a man named Michael H. About a year after Victoria's birth, the
child and her mother lived for several months in St. Thomas with Michael
H., who held Victoria out as his daughter. Carole then left Michael H., took
Victoria with her, and began residing with another man, Scott K. Finally,
Carole returned to her husband, Gerald D., with whom she and Victoria
continued to reside when Michael H. sued for parental rights. Michael H.'s
appeal ultimately came before the United States Supreme Court.
A. Denial of Paternal Uncertainty
Michael H. sought a judicial declaration that he was Victoria's father, a
status that would allow him visitation rights otherwise denied by state law.
California law presumes under most circumstances that a man whose wife
has a baby is the father of that baby.23 The only individual who may rebut
this presumption in California is the presumed or marital father-here Ger-
ald D.' Michael H. petitioned the Supreme Court to declare this presump-
tion an unconstitutional denial of his fundamental right to act as Victoria's
father.25 The Court upheld the challenged presumption in an opinion writ-
ten by Justice Scalia. Rather than critique his legal analysis,' however, this
22 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
23 CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1989) (amended 1990). The presumption
operates only if the husband of the mother is neither impotent nor sterile. The
presumption, once triggered, may be rebutted only if a motion for blood tests is made
within two years of the child's birth. The husband of the mother may file such a motion
by himself, but the mother may do so only if the biological father has filed an affidavit
acknowledging paternity. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(c)-(d) (West Supp. 1989) (amended
1990). The 1990 amendment of § 621(c) also allows the child's guardian ad litem to file a
motion for blood tests on behalf of the presumed father.
Note that the presumption of paternity requires a married woman to rely upon a man,
either her husband or her lover, to vindicate her wishes with respect to her child. This
legal dependence upon men stands in marked contrast to the "natural" capacity of a
woman who knows the identity of her child's father independently to choose to conceal
or to reveal that information.
24 CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(c) (West Supp. 1989) (amended 1990).
25 491 U.S. at 118.
26 For several such critiques, see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988
Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1989) (asserting
that Justice Scalia improperly embraces tradition as a method for determining
constitutional rights); Catherine A. Filhiol, Michael H. v. Gerald D.: Upholding the
Marital Presumption Against a Dual Paternity Claim, 50 LA. L. REV. 1015 (1990)
(arguing that Justice Scalia's analysis weighs state interests more heavily than that used
in prior substantive due process cases); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of
Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHi. L. REV. 1057, 1085-98 (1990)
(criticizing Justice Scalia's tradition-bound formulation of the level of generality the
Court should use to determine whether an asserted right is fundamental).
[Vol. 72:101
HeinOnline -- 72 B.U. L. Rev. 108 1992
FETUS-ENVY
Article focuses on Justice Scalia's rhetoric and its disempowering effect on
women.
2 7
Justice Scalia begins by characterizing the events described above as
highly unusual, asserting that "[t]he facts of this case are, we must hope,
extraordinary. ' 8 Justice Scalia's characterization of marital infidelity in the
nuclear family as "extraordinary," however, is more wish fulfillment than
fact. The opinion practically acknowledges this by qualifying the observa-
tion with the phrase "we must hope." This characterization of the facts
nevertheless reveals that Justice Scalia values highly the convention of fidel-
ity in the family.' By describing an event of which he disapproves as
"extraordinary," Justice Scalia transforms what he believes should be, into
what is. He denies the reality of adulterous relations, and replaces it with his
normative vision."
Justice Scalia invokes the authority of nature to defend the presumption of
paternity, a presumption which gives legal reality to and simultaneously
enforces the married man's assumption of his wife's fidelity. Justice Scalia
asserts that "California law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual
fatherhood."'" This statement has two apparently inconsistent implications.
On the one hand, Justice Scalia associates the "natural" with the good. In
upholding a provision of California law, he likens that body of law to
"nature itself." On the other hand, there is considerable irony in the Court's
27 I emphasize here that the analysis of Justice Scalia's rhetoric in this case is not a
critique of the result reached by the Supreme Court. Many policy concerns support the
state's desire to keep a child in a stable environment and to preclude the disruption
inherent in custody battles. In addition, one might want the states to regulate families in
their jurisdictions and to prohibit the federal government from interfering in what might
be deemed experimental laboratories. The language of the opinion, however, reveals that
this is not merely a best interests of the child determination or a federalism question for
Justice Scalia. It is an opinion about his vision of what it is to be a natural father and
what happens when a man challenges that vision and dares to claim that the Constitution
protects his challenge.
28 491 U.S. at 113.
- He speaks later of "the historic respect-indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a
term-traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary family."
491 U.S. at 123.
o Marjorie Shultz makes the more general observation that the presumption of
paternity expresses normative approval for sexual fidelity in marriage:
[W]hat purports to be an inference about biological fact [i.e., the presumption of
paternity] may actually grow out of a normative aspiration and may readily be
transformed into a prescriptive command about marriage and family, often without
acknowledgment that such a transformation has taken place. The important issue
becomes not who is, but who should be having sex with the mother: her husband.
Thus, the social construct, in fact normative and mutable, draws substantial but
disguised legitimacy from the representation that it simply expresses "givens" of
nature.
Shultz, supra note 6, at 317 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
31 491 U.S. at 118.
1992]
HeinOnline -- 72 B.U. L. Rev. 109 1992
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
disparagement of Michael H.'s claim with an appeal to nature: Michael H.
is, after all, the "natural father," as Justice Scalia acknowledges.3 2 Ironic
though his reliance on nature may be, an examination of how the presump-
tion of paternity denies men's uncertainty in identifying their biological off-
spring clarifies the purpose behind this otherwise bizarre appeal to nature.
The nature rhetoric here denies the reality of parenthood-the reality that
an adulterer like Michael H. can be a biological father to a married woman's
child-and creates in its stead a reality in which men may abandon their
uncertainty.
The institution of monogamous marriage and its mandate of sexual fidel-
ity, if entirely successful, would eliminate as a practical matter the uncer-
tainty that men face in identifying their biological children. A man would
know that his wife's children are his children too. Anthropologist Carol
Delaney emphasized this point in her interpretation of the institutions sur-
rounding marriage and fidelity in one Turkish village. She found a great
emphasis upon the purity of women and their seclusion from men:
[The villagers] commonly use the word field to describe [women's] role
.... [T]he female soil must be enclosed if a man is to know unquestion-
ably that the produce, that is, the child, is his own .... A woman's
value, in Turkish village society, therefore depends.., on whether she
is able to guarantee the security of a man's seed. 3
The weakness inherent in this institutional structure based on marital fidel-
ity, where women enhance their own value through guaranteeing men's seed
(i.e., paternal certainty) is that "it can be shaken by the behavior of
women."'" That is, men's certainty turns on women's virtue. If women vio-
late the rules-a possibility that men rarely can rule out entirely-the uncer-
tainty of paternity returns.
California's presumption of paternity and the Supreme Court's decision to
uphold it in Michael H. address precisely this precariousness-the possibil-
ity that women may not always be faithful. A conclusive legal presumption
that a man whose wife has a baby is the baby's father defines away the uncer-
tainty that married men otherwise must face. The presumption does not
merely grant Gerald D. the right to rear the child, or "the right to the child's
services and earnings,"' rights that fathers ordinarily possess; it also calls
him the "father." As if by magic, a man who did not conceive a child
replaces the true biological father. If the presumption operated only as a
reasonable inference, it would make sense for it to be rebuttable (under more
than just a few limited circumstances). And if it involved only custodial
32 See 491 U.S. at 127.
33 Carol Delaney, Seeds of Honor, Fields of Shame, in HONOR AND SHAME AND THE
UNITY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN 35, 38-39 (David D. Gilmore ed., 1987).
34 Id. at 40.
35 491 U.S. at 118-19.
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entitlements, it could consist of a list of rights rather than presumptive
parenthood.
It is not fortuitous that Justice Scalia begins his discussion with an appeal
to "nature itself." Though Michael H. is the "natural" father in fact, Gerald
D. is the "natural" father in law. As Justice Scalia notes, "California
declares it to be, except in limited circumstances, irrelevant for paternity
purposes whether a child... [in Victoria's situation] was begotten by some-
one other than the husband." '' Paternity is, in other words, irrelevant to
paternity. The natural fatherhood of Michael H. represents the inherent
uncertainty that men--even married men-must experience about their
paternity. When the law denies Michael H.'s paternity, it denies that uncer-
tainty.' The law reconstructs nature to reflect the threatened man's per-
spective of what nature should be.'
One might ask, what practical effect does this rhetorical transformation
have? Does it really make husbands believe that they are always the fathers
of their wives' children? Does it actually establish certainty for individual
men? No simple answers to these questions exist, but the rhetoric furthers
each of these objectives-and more. Although the participants in Michael
H. all knew the identity of the biological father (the adulterer), the next set
of litigants may not. Furthermore, because the holding in Michael H. and
the presumption of paternity make biological fatherhood legally irrelevant to
paternity, the next family may never discover the identity of the biological
father. The presumption essentially closes off the inquiry and requires judi-
cial notice of the "fact" that the husband of the biological mother is always
the biological father. The inability to inquire further, the legal irrelevance of
any such inquiry, and the actual protection of all paternal rights generally
reserved for only biological fathers seriously undermine the possibility of
calling into doubt a married man's paternity. The presumption thereby
eradicates the reality of uncertainty--eradicates the truth-from our
consciousness.
Consider two other examples of the law's rhetorical capacity to define
some properties as necessarily coinciding with others where their coinci-
36 491 U.S. at 119.
37 Incidentally, it also simultaneously punishes the man who reminds us of that
uncertainty.
38 Judith Resnik criticized Justice Scalia's approach to the disparities between his
expectations and the reality of what it is like to be a federal judge. Rather than adjusting
his rhetoric and world view, Resnik argued, Scalia sought to use the law to adjust reality.
For example, after discovering that federal judges hear cases that Justice Scalia viewed as
" 'trivial cases'---explicitly defined as many social security claims.. -[he suggested that
they] be removed from the federal courts." Resnik, supra note 9, at 1931. Resnik further
observed that "Justice Scalia wants to change the reality to conform to his view of what
judges 'should' do; important men do not engage in routine tasks." Id. (emphasis added).
In both the case of a father and the case of a federal judge, rather than adjusting his
expectations, Justice Scalia prefers to rewrite the contents of the categories themselves so
that they continue to fit his preconceived notions of propriety.
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dence is aspirational rather than empirically observable. Marital rape
exemptions-laws which confine the crime of rape to cases in which a man
victimizes a woman "not his wife"-reflect this phenomenon. Husbands do
not rape their wives, says the law, by definition.' In addition to protecting
husbands' sexual access to their wives, these laws construct a world in which
benign husbands do not sexually assault their wives. They reinforce social
beliefs that marital rape does not take place. From this perspective, they are
laws about denial.
A second example of this denial lies in the Biblical story of Solomon and
his determination of maternity in the "Judgment of Solomon" baby case.4°
Solomon, by offering to cut the baby in half, determined that one woman
cared about the child's life and well-being while the other did not. Of
course, one's willingness to see a baby cut in half is not relevant to maternity
because such willingness is so unusual, among non-mothers as well as
mothers. At the same time, however, unwillingness to see the baby killed is
not a sign of motherhood, but merely an indication of a minimal sensitivity
to human life. Solomon, one could argue, selected the identity of the better
guardian, not the biological mother. But Solomon did not simply choose a
custodian; he declared her the natural mother. He did so because society
needed to believe that sensitivity and caring inevitably accompany natural
motherhood. Solomon's "law" announced that the natural mother was the
better guardian, and that a mother would never let her child die. He thereby
gave legal structures the stamp of nature and quelled doubts by defining
them out of existence.
Like the presumption of paternity, however, Solomon's declaration cannot
obscure the truth entirely. Natural mothers can be abusive, and married
women can be unfaithful. But like a campaign slogan or a television adver-
tisement, legal rhetoric permits an illusion to take hold. It allows people to
embrace a falsehood and believe in it, even while they know, intellectually,
that it is false.
B. The Devaluation of Relationship
The Court in Michael H. employed a second strategy for addressing the
39 As one commentator notes: "[T]he law's sanctioning of this exercise of power [in
marital rape] transforms this power into truth. Therefore, when men say 'a husband
cannot rape his wife,' they speak the truth .... ." Note, To Have and to Hold: The
Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255
(1986). The commentator further asserts, "A 'female perspective,' on the other hand,
interprets marital rape as involving 'brutality and terror and violence and humiliation to
rival the most graphic stranger rape.' " Id. at 1260-61 (quoting D. Finkelhor, Marital
Rape: The Misunderstood Crime, Address to the New York County Lawyer's
Association (May 3, 1984)).
40 1 Kings 3:16-28. For further discussion of this story, see Martha L. Minow, The
Judgment of Solomon and the Experience of Justice, in THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE
447 (Robert M. Cover & Owen M. Fiss eds., 1979).
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unique and potentially threatening features of female reproductive capacity:
the devaluation of nurturing. This treatment of nurturing has subtle impli-
cations for the underlying difference in male and female reproductive roles as
well.
Justice Scalia omits Michael H.'s prior relationship with Victoria in calcu-
lating whether Michael has a constitutionally protected privacy right. To
determine whether there exists a fundamental right to act as the father of
one's biological child, which Michael H. has claimed, Justice Scalia employs
what he believes is a neutral approach to finding fundamental rights under
the Due Process Clause. Under this approach, he must determine into
which of two historical traditions Michael H.'s circumstances fit: one that
recognizes his interest as a fundamental liberty or one that does not.41 In
employing this strategy, Justice Scalia professes to "refer to the most specific
level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the
asserted right can be identified."'4 He settles upon the following question:
Is there a right of paternity traditionally accorded "the natural father of a
child conceived within, and born into, an extant marital union that wishes to
embrace the child[?]"4 Justice Scalia omits Michael's preexisting relation-
ship with Victoria as part of his most "specific" description of the facts of
the case." He leaves out this fact despite a "relevant tradition" in the law:
the Supreme Court's indication that a father's fundamental right to custody
of his genetic child turns on his preexisting relationship with that child 4 5-a
tradition that Justice Scalia acknowledges elsewhere in the opinion.'
By omitting Michael H.'s prior relationship with Victoria from his concise
summary of the facts, Justice Scalia devalues the act of nurturing a child.
One might believe the omission justified because the relationship was too
minimal to rise to the level necessary for a fundamental right to exist; if the
relationship had been more established, perhaps Justice Scalia would have
included it. If that had been the case, however, Justice Scalia could have
cited the lack of significant contacts between Michael H. and Victoria as
fitting within a tradition denying such a liberty interest.4 ' His failure to
41 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 127.
4 See Tribe & Doff, supra note 26, at 1085-98 (arguing that despite Justice Scalia's
claim to the contrary, his description of the relevant facts of Michael H. requires him to
select which facts to emphasize).
I Compare Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (declaring it unconstitutional to
divest an unwed father of children he has taken part in raising, without a fitness hearing)
with Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) (holding that there is no fundamental
right of custody in a father who "has never had any significant custodial, personal, or
financial relationship with [his biological daughter]").
46 491 U.S. at 123.
41 See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. at 262 n. 18 ("[A] natural father who has played a
substantial role in rearing his child has a greater claim to constitutional protection than a
mere biological parent.") (emphasis added).
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consider the relationship factor-either to bolster or to defeat Michael H.'s
paternity claim-reflects a belief in the insignificance of paternal nurturing.
By contrast, although Michael H.'s status as the "natural" father did not
decide the case, this fact does appear in Justice Scalia's condensed descrip-
tion of the significant elements of the case."
By focusing on Michael's genetic relationship with Victoria-describing
him as the "natural father"-to the exclusion of his nurturing relationship
with her, Justice Scalia elevates the significance of genetic contribution, that
which a man can do, over nurturing, that which women have traditionally
done and men have designated as belonging to a woman's sphere. True, the
consequence in Michael H. was to deny a genetic father's entitlement, but
the denial elevates genetic fathers generally by redefining their attributes in a
way that negates their uncertainty, by likening California law, the source of
Gerald D.'s counterfactual privilege, to "nature itself."
Nurturing, like certainty of parenthood, is a feature of reproduction that
is the special domain of the female: gestation is the physiological nurturing
of a developing human being. Additionally, women are still the primary
nurturers of children in our society.49 When one parent remains at home to
care for a young child, it is usually the mother.5° Women constitute an over-
whelming majority of the educators working in our nursery schools, kinder-
gartens, and elementary schools.51 Perhaps this tendency stems from
barriers to women's entry into other fields. Perhaps it results from a charac-
ter trait developed more fully by women-because they need it to sur-
vive or because pregnancy sensitizes them to human relationships.5 2
48 491 U.S. at 127 ("What counts is whether the States in fact award substantive
parental rights to the natural father of a child .... ).
49 Cf. Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 769 (1988)
("[N]ormally it is the mother who assumes day-to-day primary care." (citing Elizabeth
Maret & Barbara Finlay, The Distribution of Household Labor Among Women in Dual-
earner Families, 46 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 357, 360 (1984) (stating that the female is the
primary caretaker of children even when both parents work))).
0 Id.
51 See STATISTICAL HANDBOOK ON WOMEN IN AMERICA 129 (Cynthia Taeuber ed.,
1991) (documenting that in 1989, out of a total of 3,936,000 teachers over 20 years of age,
excluding colleges and universities, 2,853,000 were women and 1,039,000 were men).
52 West, supra note 4, at 15 ("According to cultural feminist accounts of women's
subjectivity, women value intimacy, develop a capacity for nurturance, and an ethic of
care for the 'other' with which we are connected . . . ."); see also Suzanna Sherry, Civic
Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986)
(arguing that liberal individualism is a masculine approach to the law and that civic
republicanism, by contrast, has the potential to elevate the sorts of community
connectedness authentic to the female experience). But see Iris Marion Young, Polity
and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250,
253 (1989) (arguing that civic republicanism, by mandating a homogeneous notion of the
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Whatever the explanation, in our society, nurturing is a characteristically
female trait.'
In Michael H., a man wanted the opportunity to nurture and have a rela-
tionship with his daughter. A man valued what is traditionally a woman's
role. By omitting this aspect of Michael H.'s connection to Victoria, Justice
Scalia made the primary substance of many women's lives and pregnancies
invisible. As the late Professor Frug wrote in a different context, "By omit-
ting material which is traditionally more closely linked to women and their
experiences than to men, the [writer] . . . perpetuate[s] that aspect of
gendered thinking which privileges 'male' concems. '54 Frug also asserted,
"[M]en's dominance over women permits the eclipse of traits that are associ-
ated with women. Male traits seem standard only because female traits are
suppressed from observation and consideration."'  Even radical feminists
who argue that male supremacy rather than pregnancy accounts for
women's propensity for nurturing have criticized the minimization of and
disregard for that trait.5 Nurturing, however, can be acknowledged as valu-
able without treating it as the inevitable destiny of women.
C. Genetic Fixation and the Denial of Gestation
Justice Scalia elevates "natural" fatherhood by including it in the most
"specific" description of Michael H.'s claim while excluding nurturing from
general will and social justice, suppresses variation from the supposedly "universal values
and norms which were derived from specifically masculine experience").
53 See, e.g., GILLIGAN, supra note 4.
1 Mary Joe Frug, Re-reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook,
34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065, 1087-88 (1985). Moreover, Frug observed that a case appearing
in JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS (4th ed. 1982), a
contracts casebook, denigrated the importance of nurturing and relationship. In this
case, Fitzpatrick v. Michael, 9 A.2d 639 (Md. 1939), excerpted in DAWSON et al., supra,
at 128, cited in Frug, supra, at 1080 n.58, the court did not enforce negative specific
performance for a nurse where the man she had cared for under her contract dismissed
her in violation of their contract, after years of faithful service. The reason the court did
not enjoin Mr. Michael's hiring of another nurse is that such an injunction may only be
granted for services which are unique and special. The court found that Miss
Fitzpatrick's services were not "rare or unusual," explaining that "they involved no more
than doing such things as a housewife often does." 9 A.2d at 647, excerpted in DAWSON
et al., supra, at 128, 131, quoted in Frug, supra, at 1081 & n.59. Just as the court in
Fitzpatrick did explicitly, Justice Scalia implicitly devalues what women have
traditionally cared about, ranking it lower than that which has had significance for men,
here marital fidelity.
11 Frug, supra note 54, at 1107.
56 See Symposium, supra note 4, at 25, 27. Catharine MacKinnon, a symposium
participant, states that she has some affection for Carol Gilligan's work because it values
what women do and say right now, though she criticizes the work for assuming that the
voice (feminine behavior) is actually woman's voice instead of the voice of the sexually
degraded and oppressed.
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that description. In addition to devaluing relationship as a feature of pater-
nity, the elevation of genetic fatherhood serves to deny the unique female
role in reproduction. The denial may be disguised by men's and women's
equal contribution to the genetic composition of their children. The focus
on genetics, however, represents a strand of reproductive theories that
diverts attention from uniquely female capacities in order to promote
inequality.
In ancient times, many believed that men were the sole contributors to the
"form" or "heredity" of their children, while women provided only nutrition
and raw material.57 Aristotle, for example, wrote that
what the male contributes to generation is the form and the efficient
cause, while the female contributes the material .... If, then, the male
stands for the effective and active, and the female, considered as female,
for the passive, it follows that what the female would contribute to the
semen of the male would not be semen but material for the semen to
work upon ....- *8
Carol Delaney observed a similar concept at work among the Turkish villag-
ers she studied. "The child comes from the seed .... The female body, like
soil, is a generalized medium of nurture .... Blood in the womb and milk at
the breast ... swell the being of the child but in no way affect its essential
identity. That is a matter of seed."' 9 Finally, a feminist theologian, Gerta
Lerner, similarly described the Biblical world as that in which "'God's
blessing of man's seed which would be planted in the passive receptacle of
woman's womb symbolically defined gender relations under patriarchy.' "60
Although modem genetics has exposed the empirical inaccuracy of this
picture of reproduction, it still retains a powerful influence over our culture
and language. For example, parents typically give the father's last name to
their children. They are therefore identifiably "his" children. Similarly, a
man's ability to become erect and ejaculate sperm is termed "potency," an
active, powerful noun, while a woman's ability to become pregnant is termed
"fertility," a word which connotes passive protective capacity.
Moreover, modem societies have developed a new quasi-scientific myth of
male importance to replace the religious myth identified by Delaney and
Lerner: it is now scientifically accepted that a woman contributes half of her
11 See generally Carol Delaney, The Meaning of Paternity and the Virgin Birth Debate,
J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST., Sept. 1986, at 494 (describing the Virgin Birth as a
male ideological metaphor for all human reproduction, in which the woman is a vessel
and the male is the true parent).
58 ARISTOTLE, DE GENERATIONE ANIMALIUM, Book 1, Bekker nos. 729a10-12,
729a28-32 (Arthur Platt trans., 1910), in THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (J.A. Smith &
W.D. Ross eds., 1912).
9 Delaney, supra note 33, at 35, 38.
60 GERTA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY 200-01 (1986) (arguing that a
monotheistic conception of the universe contributed to a patriarchal society), quoted in
Resnik, supra note 9, at 1918-19.
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child's genetic material. Women, however, are uniquely capable of preg-
nancy. Thus, although men threatened by pregnancy can no longer cope
with the threat by denying women's genetic contribution to children, they
can sustain the notion that the male role in reproduction is not qualitatively
less important than the female role through a genetic fixation which denies
an important difference between the sexes. Pregnancy and birth are thereby
reduced to nonessential features of procreation. In the new mythology, the
law invokes scientific authority to conclude that only the contribution of
genetic material is significant in reproduction.
IV. FROZEN EMBRYOS
The denial of women's unique role in reproduction makes a more explicit
appearance in Davis v. Davis,61 a frozen embryo case in Tennessee, than it
did in Michael H. Although the appellate and trial courts in Davis disagree
as to both result and rationale, both express views of the world and repro-
duction that effectively deny pregnancy by equating male and female repro-
ductive experiences.
Davis involved a married couple who underwent in vitro procedures
(whereby an ovum is fertilized in a laboratory container) to produce nine
embryos genetically their own.82 After two unsuccessful implantation
attempts, the couple had seven of the embryos cryogenically preserved for
future implantation.6 The Davises' marriage ended in divorce, and Mrs.
Davis sought custody of the embryos for implantation and pregnancy. Mr.
Davis, however, wished to prevent implantation and therefore asked the
court to award joint custody of the embryos to him and Mrs. Davis, effec-
tively preventing implantation without his consent.
A. Davis 1
The trial court found that "Mr. and Mrs. Davis ha[d] produced human
beings, in vitro, to be known as their child or children;" ' that as human
children they were entitled to a custody award in line with their best inter-
ests; and that implantation-the mother's stated intention-would serve the
"children's" best interests. Accordingly, the court awarded "temporary cus-
tody" of the embryos to Mrs. Davis.65
The court's language and reasoning reveal a significant commitment to
demonstrating that life begins at conception. The court considered extensive
61 No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989) ("Davis 1"),
rev'd, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990) ("Davis 2"),
appeal granted, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 466 (Tenn. Dec. 3, 1990) (per curiam).
62 Davis 1, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *7.
63 Id. at *8. "Cryopreservation is a procedure whereby the cells of plants or animals
are subjected to freezing in laboratory and unthawed through a step by step procedure for
later use. Liquid nitrogen is generally utilized as the freezing agent." Id. at *6 n.3.
64 Id. at *2.
65 Id. at *37.
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scientific expert testimony on the question. As part of its evidence, the court
noted that "all four witnesses agree that the seven cryopressed embryos are
human"" (although no one had challenged the species of the embryos). It
pointed out one doctor's testimony that "there is nothing before the embryo;
before an embryo there is only a sperm and an egg" 67 and added that "[n]o
scientist has ever offered the opinion that an embryo is property. '
A scientist has no special expertise to evaluate whether or not a sperm and
an egg are "nothing," and while it is true that no scientist has ever offered
the opinion that an embryo is property, it is equally true-and equally irrele-
vant-that no scientist has ever offered the scientific opinion that the recita-
tion of the Lord's prayer in public schools violates the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment. These are legal questions, not matters of scientific
expertise. This appeal to scientific testimony, however, is very revealing
because it represents an effort to give the stamp of scientific "objectivity" to
the idea that once fertilization has occurred, a child has been created. 9
It is not immediately apparent why the court took the trouble to "demon-
strate" that life begins at conception. Such a proof was not necessary to
justify a custody award to Mrs. Davis. The state's interest in the mere
potentiality of life would have provided sufficient justification. Though abor-
tion law is currently in a state of flux, 70 even under the Supreme Court's
most liberal formulation of abortion rights, the state has an interest in poten-
tial life.7 ' In Davis, moreover, the privacy interests of the man and the
woman were arguably equal because, unlike in the abortion context, the
court's decision would not implicate either individual's right to be free of a
physical burden like pregnancy. Instead, the state had to interfere with
either Mr. Davis's reproductive privacy-by denying him the right not to
procreate--or Mrs. Davis's reproductive privacy-by denying her the right
to procreate. The court therefore could have found that the state's interest
in potential life tilted the balance in favor of Mrs. Davis. It would have been
a simple matter to decide the case on these grounds.
"Demonstrating" that life begins at conception, however, does have
important implications for the question of the respective roles of males and
females in procreation. When the court describes an embryo as a child, it
66 Id. at *12.
67 Id. at *15.
8 Id.
69 Although such an idea has obvious implications for the abortion context, the court
did not exploit it for these implications. The court in fact made a point of distinguishing
this case from that of abortion, claiming that the state's compelling interest in human life
in the abortion cases is not identical to its interest in the in vitro context. See id. at *32-
33. The court was not, therefore, necessarily attempting to lay the groundwork for
abortion decisionmaking.
70 Compare Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) with Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
71 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
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implies that genetic contribution is biologically sufficient for procreation. In
the court's reconstruction of nature, pregnancy and childbirth-of which
only women are capable-are not essential to reproduction, just as in
Michael H., that activity which women tend to do-nurturing-was not
essential to the definition of constitutionally protected fatherhood. More-
over, by calling the award of the embryo to Mrs. Davis "temporary cus-
tody,"72 an appellation which is gender-neutral, the court denies that
pregnancy is special; it obscures the fact that women have capabilities that
men lack. A man, no less than a woman, can have temporary custody of a
child. The court similarly obscures the unique role of pregnancy in the
development of an embryo when it compares an embryo to "a newborn
human being, left naked in a field without ... sustenance, aid and assist-
ance."73 A newborn under these circumstances could survive with the assist-
ance of any caring individual, male or female. The embryo's needs, on the
other hand, are more specific: only a woman, through pregnancy, can pro-
vide the requisite "sustenance, aid and assistance."
In obscuring the essentiality of pregnancy, the court obviously could not
deny that pregnancy is a necessary element of the reproductive process. The
court implicitly acknowledges this necessity by preferring implantation and
the consequent "custody" award to the only party capable of gestation-a
woman. That something is necessary, however, does not mean that it is
important or part of the "essence" of that to which it is necessary. For
example, it is necessary to any job that an employee travel to work each day,
but we would not describe the commute as part of the essence of most jobs.
Similarly, although reproduction requires pregnancy, and children's survival
requires nurturing, the Davis 1 and Michael H. courts describe the essence of
reproduction and parenting without overtly acknowledging these elements.
By cloaking the processes in gender-neutral terms, these courts acknowledge
the occurrence of implantation, pregnancy, and nurturing, without attribut-
ing special capabilities to women.74
72 Davis 1, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *37.
73 Id. at *28.
74 The resort to gender-neutral phraseology and denial rhetoric also played an
important role in a recent surrogacy case in Los Angeles. In that case, the birth mother
was not genetically related to the child she bore. The trial judge awarded full custody to
the genetic parents and ruled that the birth mother-Anna Johnson-was in no way the
child's parent by virtue of having carried him for nine months of development. The judge
likened Johnson's pregnancy to "a foster parent who cares for a child while the 'natural
mother' is unable to do so." Catherine Gewertz, Genetic Parents Given Sole Custody of
Child; Surrogate: Judge Rules that the Woman Who Bore an Infant for an Infertile Couple
Has No Rights to the Boy, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1990, at Al. Note that "natural"
parenthood there included only genetic contribution. The judge abstracted away
pregnancy as incidental to parenthood and gender-neutralized it with the appellation
"foster parent."
Margaret Jane Radin suggests that the existence of surrogacy arrangements, which
until recently involved a surrogate who was both the genetic and the gestational mother,
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Denying that pregnancy is essential to reproduction, as the court did in
Davis 1, is not only counterintuitive, it is also inconsistent with the court's
own reasoning. To bolster Mrs. Davis's claim to the embryos, the court
observes that "Mrs. Davis went through many painful, physically tiring,
emotionally and mentally taxing procedures" in having her ova extracted for
fertilization and subsequent implantation.75 This observation effectively
acknowledges that submitting to painful and difficult experiences in the pro-
cess of creating an entity gives one an entitlement to that entity. This
acknowledgment is inconsistent with the way in which the court abstracts
away from the definition of creating a child the most significantly laborious
and difficult parts of the process-pregnancy and childbirth.
B. Davis 2
The appellate court in Davis 2 engages in a form of denial related to that
evidenced in Davis 1. Rather than deny the role of pregnancy in the defini-
tion of parenthood, however, the Davis 2 court denies the unique nature of
the hardships of pregnancy.
The premises underlying the two Davis opinions are facially in opposition.
The appellate court firmly rejects the trial court's analysis of the Davis facts
as well as its decision to award the embryos to Mrs. Davis.7' Based on its
analysis of Roe v. Wade, Tennessee statutes, and Tennessee common law, the
appellate court concludes that embryos are not people." In support of this
finding, the court points to, among other things, the fact that "their [the
embryos'] development was limited to the 8 cell stage. At this juncture there
is no development of the nervous system, the circulatory system, or the pul-
monary system. s78 Because embryos are not yet people, and therefore have
no cognizable "best interests," the appellate court looks to Mr. Davis's
"feeds the further understanding that the important genetic line is the male line, and that
women are fungible in helping to perpetuate it." Margaret Jane Radin, Market-
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1929-30 (1987). 1 would add that the genetic
fixation that characterizes surrogacy arrangements--even and especially when both
adoptive parents have contributed the genetic material-feeds the understanding that the
male role in reproduction (genetic contribution) is the only significant factor in defining a
parent, and that women's additional role (gestation) is fungible and nonessential.
11 Davis 1, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *6.
76 By the time the Davis case reached the appellate court, Mary Stowe (formerly Mrs.
Davis) no longer intended to implant the embryos, but instead wished "to donate the
embryos so that another childless couple may use them." Davis 2, 1990 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 642, at * 1 n. 1. This fact, however, received only brief mention in the appellate
court decision and played no apparent role in the court's reasoning or conclusions.
Therefore, there is no reason to think the court's decision would have been different if
Mary Stowe had wished to implant the embryos in her own body, as she had in Davis 1.
The court awarded joint control of the fertilized ova to Mary Stowe and Junior Davis,
her former husband. Id. at *9.
" Davis 2, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at *7.
78 Id. at *2. Note that this appeal to science parallels that found in the trial court's
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"right not to beget a child where no pregnancy has taken place," part of his
constitutionally protected privacy right in matters of procreation. 9 In sup-
port of Mr. Davis's privacy right, the court states:
On the facts of this case, it would be repugnant and offensive to consti-
tutional principles to order Mary Sue [formerly Mrs. Davis] to implant
these fertilized ova against her will. It would be equally repugnant to
order Junior [Mr. Davis] to bear the psychological, if not the legal, con-
sequences of paternity against his will.'
It is no doubt true that Mr. Davis had an interest in whether or not his
sperm were used to create children. For this reason, not all men are willing
to be sperm donors, nor is any man legally required to be one, and those men
who do choose to donate sperm must often sign waivers giving up any rights
or duties to the future products of their sperm. Implicitly, Griswold and
Eisenstadt protect the rights of married and unmarried people, not just
women, to use birth control because of the validity of a man's interest in not
becoming a father against his will. Finally, it is at least in part because men
are invested with legal control over the destinies of their sperm that they can
later be charged with supporting children in paternity actions.
Nonetheless, recognizing that forced paternity constitutes a harm does not
require that this harm be equated with forced maternity. Indeed, the court's
own argument belies the assertion that forced paternity is truly equivalent to
forced implantation. In order to demonstrate the horrors of forced pater-
nity, the court begins by declaring that forced implantation is "repugnant
and offensive," 8' and then analogizes forced paternity with an uncontrover-
sially horrible practice, forced implantation. Forced implantation, however,
is repugnant at least in part because of its intrusiveness on women's bodies.
Thus, the moral force behind the court's conclusion that forced paternity is
repugnant depends upon a comparison to a practice that would uniquely
burden women. By selecting for analogy a burden that falls uniquely on
females, the court unwittingly provides support for the proposition that
forced implantation really does impose a qualitatively greater burden on
women than forced paternity imposes on men.
Moreover, just as the court in Davis 1 did not need to assert that life
opinion; this time, however, the court invokes science to prove that embryos are not
people.
79 Id. at *5-6 (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977)
(invalidating New York statute limiting the sale of contraceptives and prohibiting their
advertisement)). The Davis 2 court also cites Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972) (overturning criminal conviction based upon Massachusetts statute prohibiting the
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons), Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485 (1965) (invalidating Connecticut statute criminalizing the use of any drug or
article to prevent conception), and In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 822 (Colo. 1990)
(reversing order sought by guardian to sterilize incapacitated adult woman).
so Davis 2, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at *8-9 (emphasis added).
81 Id.
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begins at conception to justify its custody award to Mrs. Davis, the court in
Davis 2 could have argued persuasively that forced paternity is unconstitu-
tional without equating it with forced maternity. It could have expanded
upon the argument that having children entails ongoing emotional relation-
ships and responsibilities, both legal and moral, into which one should only
enter voluntarily. Unwanted parenthood is a psychologically injurious expe-
rience that no one should have to endure. Under Griswold and Eisenstadt,
the privacy right includes the right to decide not to have children, and
neither case distinguishes this right as a uniquely female one.
The court in Davis 2 rejects this strategy, however, and chooses instead to
equate forced paternity with forced implantation. In so doing, the court
abstracts the pain and vulnerability that women alone endure out of the defi-
nition of human experience. It mandates gender-blindness even though real-
ity makes greater demands of women than of men.
Robin West elaborated upon the harm of the unwanted physical intrusion
that women alone suffer when forced to be parents. She related that
"[a]ccording to radical feminism, women's connection with the 'other' is
above all else invasive and intrusive: women's potential for material 'connec-
tion' invites invasion into the physical integrity of our bodies, and intrusion
into the existential integrity of our lives." 2 West observed that "the original
feminist argument for reproductive freedom turned on the definitive radical
feminist insight that pregnancy-the invasion of the body by the other to
which women are distinctly vulnerable-is an injury and ought to be treated
as such."' A right to procreative privacy and liberty resting upon this argu-
ment would not have any necessary application for males, either in general
or in the specific circumstances of Davis. West proposed, nevertheless, that
it is ... the radical argument-that pregnancy is a dangerous, psychi-
cally consuming, existentially intrusive, and physically invasive assault
upon the body which in turn leads to a dangerous, consuming, intru-
sive, invasive assault on the mother's self-identity-that best captures
women's own sense of the injury and danger of pregnancy, whether or
not it captures the law's sense of what an unwanted pregnancy involves,
or why women should have the right to terminate it."
Some statements made by women experiencing unwanted pregnancy dur-
ing the pre-Roe era, and cited by West, poignantly illustrate the pain felt by
women undergoing unwanted pregnancy. One woman reported that she
"'could not conceive of any event which would so profoundly impact upon
82 See West, supra note 4, at 15. West contrasted radical feminism with cultural
feminism before uniting the two in her connection thesis. Cultural feminism focuses
upon the positive qualities of women and women's experience, while radical feminism
emphasizes the harm women experience because of sexual hierarchy and the humiliation
inherent in being a woman in our world today. Id. at 29.
83 Id. at 30.
84 Id.
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any man.' ,a Another wrote that "'[y]ou cannot possibly know what it is
like to be the helpless pawn of nature.' "86 A third woman recounted that
when she learned she was pregnant, "I was sick in my heart and I thought I
would kill myself. It was as if I had been told my body had been invaded
with cancer.",87 West also has pointed out the similarity between having an
unwanted pregnancy and being raped. "An unwanted fetus, no less than an
unwanted penis," she related, "invades my body, violates my physical
boundaries, occupies my body and can potentially destroy my sense of
self."'  Because unwanted pregnancy is an experience unique to women,
these examples expose as false the Davis 2 court's statement that forced
fatherhood and forced motherhood are "equally repugnant."
Had the court ordered Mrs. Davis to have an embryo implanted, it would
have effectively achieved both forms of invasion that West elucidated. First,
the forced implantation procedure itself would parallel forced intercourse.
" 'The vagina itself is muscled and the muscles have to be pushed apart ....
She is opened up, split down the center. She is occupied-physically, inter-
nally, in her privacy . . . .' 9 Second, the resulting unwanted pregnancy
would be a prolonged physical intrusion. Yet the court in Davis 2 equates
this two-stage physical invasion with using a man's consensually surrendered
sperm to accomplish a pregnancy which he opposes.
In light of the obvious differences between forced maternity and forced
paternity, one might ask why the Davis 2 court equates them. One might
wonder generally why a court would want to deny that women have unique
reproductive experiences. One answer is that denial rhetoric is about con-
trol. Denying pregnancy permitted the court to remove control over repro-
duction from a woman and to vest it in a man, Mr. Davis, by giving him veto
power over implantation of the embryos. The court could have given Mr.
Davis this control without the accompanying denial. What the denial per-
mits is the pretense that men ordinarily can and do have this control over
reproduction. Ordinarily, however, when an embryo is growing inside of a
woman's body and is not frozen in a petri dish, a man has neither the ability
nor the constitutional right to arrest the development of that embryo to
avoid unwanted fatherhood.90
85 Id. at 31 (quoting Amicus Brief for the National Abortion Rights Action League et
al. at 13, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747 (1986) (Nos. 84-495 and 84-1379)) [hereinafter NARAL Amicus Brief].
86 Id. (quoting NARAL Amicus Brief, supra note 85, at 19). Note that, unlike Justice
Scalia, this anonymous woman did not equate the "natural" with the good.
87 Id. (quoting NARAL Amicus Brief, supra note 85, at 28).
88 Id. at 35.
89 Id. at 34 (quoting ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 122-23 (1987)). West cited a
description of intercourse generally, not one of only rape. One need not, however, view
intercourse as inherently assaultive to recognize the description's application to non-
consensual intercourse or, analogously, to forced implantation.
90 Cf Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding unconstitutional
1992]
HeinOnline -- 72 B.U. L. Rev. 123 1992
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Similarly, as we have seen, the Supreme Court used denial rhetoric to
transfer control over reproduction in Michael H. Because men do not ordi-
narily control the development of an embryo from conception to birth, a
man does not ordinarily know with certainty that a developing child is his
own. In Michael H., however, Justice Scalia obscured this inherent uncer-
tainty by calling California law "like nature itself."91 Justice Scalia and the
California presumption of paternity thereby rewrote nature. Rewriting
nature and defining the "natural" father as the husband of the natural
mother enabled the law to extinguish a man's otherwise inevitable uncer-
tainty about whose biological children his wife is bearing.
The attempt to neutralize or deny a woman's unique capacity and control
in the process of creating children has not appeared in every male judge's
opinion in every case involving reproduction. In his dissent in Stanley v.
Illinois, 2 for example, Chief Justice Burger suggested that a biological
mother has a greater connection with her child by virtue of her physical role
in reproduction than does a biological father. He wrote: "I believe that a
State is fully justified in concluding, on the basis of common human experi-
ence, that the biological role of the mother in carrying and nursing an infant
creates stronger bonds between her and the child than the bonds resulting
from the male's often casual encounter."' Similarly, in Lehr v. Robertson,'
the Supreme Court stated in a footnote that " '[t]he mother carries and bears
the child, and in this sense her parental relationship is clear. The validity of
the father's parental claims must be gauged by other measures.' "" The
Court in Lehr was not gauging genetic motherhood and fatherhood, but
rather determining the entitlements of each genetic parent. In the same foot-
note, the Court referred to the fact that "the relation between a father and
his natural child may acquire constitutional protection,"96 and thereby
acknowledged the particular individual's "natural" fatherhood, yet denied
protection to his parental claims.
Commentators have also recognized the value of nurturing and its role in
pregnancy. For example, Robin West has argued that the special relation-
ship between a mother and her child which develops during pregnancy helps
a statute requiring married women and minors to obtain consent from their respective
husbands or parents prior to receiving abortions).
91 491 U.S. at 118.
92 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding unconstitutional a statute which provided that, upon
the death of the mother, children of unwed parents would be automatically declared
wards of the state, without a hearing to determine the father's fitness as a parent).
1a Id. at 665 (Burger, J., dissenting).
9 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (upholding as constitutional a statute restricting a putative
father's right to enjoin the adoption of his child by the mother's husband where the father
and child's only connection was biological).
I Id. at 260 n.16 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979)).
9 Id. (emphasis added).
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define women as existentially "connected" to, rather than autonomous from,
the "other."
[T]he claim that we are individuals "first," and the claim that what
separates us is epistemologically and morally prior to what connects us
- while "trivially true" of men, are patently untrue of women. Women
are not essentially, necessarily, inevitably, invariably, always, and for-
ever separate from other human beings: women, distinctively, are quite
clearly "connected" to another human life when pregnant.'
Recognizing a mother's special relationship to her newborn baby, how-
ever, may entail two troubling corollaries. First, some may be tempted to
derive from that relationship a mandate upon women that they act as the
primary caretakers, effectively turning their pedestal-i.e., their superior
role in reproduction-into a cage.9" As both MacKinnon and Minow have
suggested, the price of emphasizing women's difference is often exclusion
and maltreatment. In a male-dominated world where the prototypical
human being is male, "difference" means inferiority and stigmatization; one
must be male, for all practical purposes, to be treated as human." Second,
acknowledging women's special relationship with their children may risk
driving men away from child-rearing. For example, Chief Justice Burger's
dissenting opinion in Stanley v. Illinois did not fairly credit Mr. Stanley's
relationship with his children, with whom he lived and whom he raised,
when it spoke generally of a "male's often casual encounter" with his
child.' 1 The majority opinion gave more weight to the father's interest, not-
ing that "[tihe private interest here [is] that of a man in the children he has
sired and raised."'' 1 It would be unfortunate to discourage relationships like
the one Mr. Stanley may have had with his children in the process of
acknowledging the unique female role in procreation.
Ignoring a woman's special capacity to become pregnant and to give birth
as both courts did in Davis, however, is neither necessary nor likely to liber-
ate women from the pedestal/cage. Instead, it will generate insensitivity to
what a woman must endure to have a child, and it will perpetuate the mini-
mization of experiences which are unique to women. Accordingly, the
world will continue to be structured around male life.
9 West, supra note 4, at 2.
98 Cf Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 345 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(noting that restrictions which facially purport to protect women may actually work to
limit their autonomy).
9 See MACKINNON, supra note 4, at 656 ("The white man's meaning of equality is
being equal to him, which is the same as being the same as him. This meaning of equality
has not valued any cultural or sexual distinctiveness except his own."); MiNOW, supra
note 4, at 42 (proposing that the "norm" is defined in terms of a male norm, and since
women differ from men, they must bear the burden of their difference).
1oo 405 U.S. at 665 (Burger, J., dissenting).
101 405 U.S. at 651.
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V. PUNISHMENT AND THE WORKPLACE
Structuring the world around male life effectively punishes women for
experiences only they can have. The preceding pages have explored two
cases in which the courts denied and devalued pregnancy. Not only do these
two rhetorical attacks cause harm, but they also set the stage for the third
device-punishment. Punishment, as rhetoric and result, is most prominent
in the sphere of the workplace.
In Geduldig v. Aiello,"°2 the Supreme Court upheld as nondiscriminatory a
state law excluding disabilities associated with pregnancy from the list of
employment disabilities for which leave was available. The Court reasoned
that because "there is no risk from which men are protected and women are
not [and] there is no risk from which women are protected and men are
not,"" the law treats men and women equally. The premise-that neither
women nor men are protected from the disabilities associated with preg-
nancy-is false, however, because men cannot become pregnant, and are
therefore inherently "protected." Only a workplace norm designed around
men's lives would not, ordinarily, protect employees from disabilities flowing
from pregnancy." By defining the "normal" employee as one who cannot
become pregnant, the Court was able to sanction an employment policy that
treated pregnancy differently from all other health-related disabilities.
Some feminists choose to focus not on how women's normal experiences
differ from those of men. Instead, they try to find analogues to events such
as pregnancy in the male experience, and demand that the female event and
its analogue receive equal treatment."5 Wendy Williams advocates such a
gender-neutral approach to discrimination, and accordingly recommends
that we analogize female pregnancy to general disability."° She abandons
this analogy, and implicitly the whole approach, however, in a telling foot-
note confronting the argument that pregnancy, unlike most disabilities, is
voluntary and therefore should not be treated like other disabilities.'0 7 She
responds that
as a social matter, pregnancy is not meaningfully voluntary any more
than eating or sleeping is voluntary. All are basic functions of the
human animal necessary to survival. In a workforce composed of men
and women, it is as appropriate to expect employers to provide for preg-
102 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
103 Id. at 496-97.
104 See MINOW, supra note 4, at 58. Minow observes that the workplace is
constructed upon a vision of the male employee, and is therefore not a "neutral" place
but an affirmatively male place. "The problem [is] not women, or pregnancy, but the
effort to fit women's experiences and needs into categories forged with men in mind." Id.
105 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 4, at 342-43.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 354 n.114.
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nancy-related absence as it is to expect them to provide time off to
employees to eat and sleep.'08
This is my position. Pregnancy is part of women's lives and should be
accommodated for that reason, not because it finds a persuasive analogue in
male experience. When faced with a potential discrepancy between preg-
nancy and other disabilities, Williams momentarily accepts this position,
demonstrating the inherent failure of gender neutrality to ensure that women
will count as whole people, regardless of whether their experience finds a
convincing analogue in the male life cycle.
It is not because ignoring the differences among people is inherently just
that it is often appropriate for the law to ignore gender distinctions, as well
as race or national origin distinctions. Rather, it is because no one should be
disabled because she or he belongs to one group rather than to another, espe-
cially where that group has historically been victimized. Where two groups
are not equally situated, however, as men and women are not in their suscep-
tibility to pregnancy, treating them as if they were alike ratifies inequity with
the force of law by accommodating men's but not women's needs.
Though nature or biology may dictate that women must undergo preg-
nancy, in part a disabling experience,' in order to create children, nature
expresses no opinion about the job-related consequences of pregnancy for
women. Nature also does not command that women be forbidden from
choosing to use birth control or undergo an abortion to escape from that
experience. And nature does not hold that time away from work to care for
a child must be punished with discharge or the loss of seniority, or that
seniority-which presumes the capacity to stay employed at a particular
place for an uninterrupted interval of time-is an appropriate measure of
merit or entitlement."0 People-legislators, judges, and citizens-make the
normative choices that penalize women for their unique reproductive
capacity.
Batteries, Women, and Fetuses
The logic of a case like Geduldig creates a Catch-22 for women seeking
equal employment opportunities. Initially, the courts deny that the work-
place is hostile to women by accepting its features as gender-neutral, rather
than male-centric. Having denied that the workplace is male, thereby
approving its structure, courts then hold that women-by virtue of their
108 Id.
109 To say that pregnancy is disabling is not, of course, to deny that for many women
it is a satisfying and worthwhile experience as well. The joys that result from pregnancy
may outweigh, but do not eliminate, whatever disabling effects pregnancy can entail.
110 See, e.g., Mary Joe Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market
Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REV. 55, 55-61 (1979) (arguing that the labor
market is structured around a prototypical employee who does not have childcare
responsibilities-i.e., a male with a wife at home-and thereby disadvantages working
mothers in gaining job security and advancement).
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ability to become pregnant--do not fit into the approved structure. There-
fore, excluding them is permissible. The second half of this trap, the retalia-
tory preoccupation with pregnancy, is exemplified by so-called "fetal
protection" policies.
In 1991, the Supreme Court decided International Union, UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc.,"' a case confronting what has been an explosive issue for
feminists and others: how to treat workplace dangers to women's reproduc-
tive health. In 1982, Johnson Controls, a battery manufacturer, instituted a
fetal protection policy. This policy excluded all women, except those who
could affirmatively demonstrate their sterility, from any position which
could expose them to lead levels deemed harmful to fetuses. The policy
extended beyond positions that actually exposed workers to dangerous lead
levels;" 2 it included any position which could result in a promotion or trans-
fer to a position involving such exposure. Women were therefore subject to
the policy even if their actual jobs involved no exposure at all."' The plain-
tiffs in the case, the class of production and maintenance employees affected
by the policy, challenged the policy under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act,114 as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act."15 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a grant of summary
judgment to the defendants.A substantial portion of the rhetoric in two of the four court of appeals
opinions 1 6 is punitive in its tone as well as in its concrete consequences for
women. Though this Article's focus has been only upon rhetoric until this
point, punishment rhetoric is inextricably intertwined with the results
reached in a particular case. Therefore, this section will include a critique of
the results reached by, as well as the rhetoric of, the court of appeals opin-
ions in Johnson Controls. This Seventh Circuit case takes the male-centered
workplace as neutral and then punishes women for not fitting in. It also uses
science and its authority to support this punishment. In addition, on a more
111 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991), rev'g 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), aff'g 680 F. Supp. 309
(E.D. Wis. 1988).
112 111 S. Ct. at 1200.
11 Id.
114 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
115 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988) ("[W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes
... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work .... ").
116 The four opinions produced in the Seventh Circuit en banc court were the
majority, authored by Judge Coffey, the dissents of Judges Posner and Easterbrook, and a
third dissent by Judge Cudahy, in which he notes that "[i]t is a matter of some interest
that, of the twelve federal judges to have considered this case to date, none has been
female." 886 F.2d at 902 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). The case produced three opinions in
the Supreme Court: the majority, authored by Justice Blackmun, and separate
concurrences by Justices White and Scalia. The analysis here will focus on the opinions
of Judges Coffey, Posner, and Easterbrook in the court of appeals.
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subtle level, the Johnson Controls opinions continue the denial and devalua-
tion strategies discussed above.
Judge Coffey, the author of the majority opinion, began his summary of
the facts by asserting that "[s]ince 1982 Johnson Controls, Inc.... has main-
tained a fetal protection policy designed to prevent unborn children and
their mothers from suffering the adverse effects of lead exposure.""' 7
Women might expect that a policy protecting them and their unborn chil-
dren would require lead reduction at the workplace. The Johnson Controls
policy required instead that the lead stay and the women go." l8
The company's justification for adopting this policy was its determination,
"based upon scientific research," that "it was medically necessary to bar
women from working in high lead exposure positions in the battery manu-
facturing division." 119 This claim of scientific and medical necessity resem-
bles the Davis 1 court's discussion of life beginning at conception. 120 In both
cases, science, the "objective" observer, dictates that pregnant women are
superfluous-in the one case, to reproduction, in the other, to the workplace.
In Davis 1, pregnancy was not a significant feature of reproduction: once
there was a zygote there was a child, and procreation for all intents and
purposes had already taken place. In Johnson Controls, the pregnant or
potentially pregnant woman was not considered an essential part of the
workplace. Lead, however, was indispensable. If women and lead clashed,
it was "medically necessary" to bar women. The political choice to consider
women superfluous was translated into a scientifically inevitable and "neces-
sary" outcome.' 2 '
Judge Coffey's majority opinion addressed the question of why the women
and not the lead must go by stating that neither Johnson Controls nor any
other battery manufacturer has been able to design a lead-free battery or
implement a procedure which would reduce lead exposure to an acceptable
level for fertile women. 22 This statement was presumably included to
117 886 F.2d at 874.
118 Wendy Williams claims that such protective legislation which excludes women is
the inevitable, if unintended, consequence of giving those in power the ability to recognize
the uniqueness of pregnancy. See Williams, supra note 4, at 371-72.
The restriction of health and safety regulation of the workplace to women employees
certainly guarantees them a competitive disadvantage relative to men, as well as ensuring
that workplace conditions remain the same-i.e., oppressive-as a rule. See, e.g.,
Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1557 (1983) (demonstrating that humanizing the workplace by
making it replicate the family incorporates the gender hierarchy of the family, and noting
that legislation protective of women achieves the same effect as gender-neutral labor
legislation whose protections men may waive).
119 886 F.2d at 876.
120 See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
121 See MACKINNON, supra note 4, at 38 ("Excluding women is always an option if
equality feels in tension with the pursuit itself.").
122 886 F.2d at 878.
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demonstrate that it is either impossible or unreasonable to design such a
battery or to implement such a procedure. This implicit assertion should be
met with skepticism, however, because the law has historically determined
what is "reasonable" from a male standpoint.'23 The question then is
whether industry, owned, controlled and largely populated by men, may be
trusted to consider women's interests important enough to put all possible
efforts into making the workplace safe for them. 24 Judge Coffey ignored the
male bias of the industry and trusted it to do just that.
Judge Coffey could have acknowledged the fact that what industries are
currently able to produce and what they could learn to produce with a differ-
ent set of incentives are two different things. Instead, he complacently
affirmed the policy at issue, with all its controversial scientific propositions,
on a motion for summary judgment. He could have responded to the bias in
the battery-making industry and provided the necessary set of incentives, by
permitting both anti-discrimination law and tort law to operate in that
industry. In that way, the industry would have had the appropriate motiva-
tion to move toward the creation of a battery-making process that accommo-
dates fertile women in the workplace. But he chose not to do so.
Judge Coffey's gender blindness permitted him to punish women by
excluding them on the basis of their capacity for pregnancy. Although even
the most reactionary of judges today would probably not say, "a woman's
place is in the home," he might find other ways, such as excluding women
from the workplace, to say essentially the same thing. By legally immuniz-
ing women's exclusion, the court of appeals helped to ensure that the indus-
try would make little effort to find safe alternatives to lead batteries. It is less
expensive to exclude women and hire men than to attempt to make the
workplace safe for both.
Judge Coffey acknowledged that both the fetal protection policy and the
exposure of fetuses to lead would result in harm. He described the case,
however, as one in which "the interest in financial reward [to the excluded
woman] is balanced against a medically established risk of the birth of a
medically or physically deprived baby and where the challenged distinction
is based upon the reality that only the female of the human species is capable
of childbearing.'1 5 This characterization of the balancing devalues women
as independent, self-sufficient human beings, and it devalues them because of
123 See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986) (noting that the law
determines whether or not a rape has taken place by asking whether a man would believe
his actions to constitute rape, rather than whether a woman would experience being
raped); Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 LAW & PHIL. 217 (1989) (same).
124 See Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 801 (1989)
(arguing that the only way women can enter the workforce and have their needs met and
their experiences taken into account is by "insisting on a redefinition of the ideal
worker").
125 886 F.2d at 883. Note that a woman's unique capacity is emphasized here in a
context in which the court views that uniqueness as disqualifying. By contrast, in the
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their unique capacity to bear children. A woman who is jobless because of a
fetal protection policy would probably not use the term "financial reward"
to describe her interest in working. If she derives no fulfillment from the job
and works only because she needs the money, then "economic necessity"
would be a more apt description of her situation. Similarly, if she works
because working gives her a sense of control that reliance upon a man for
sustenance does not, "financial reward" also fails to capture all that she
stands to lose.
.Consider once again the maxim, "a woman's place is in the home." This
maxim implies, among other things, that women are not individuals with the
right to pursue their own goals; it suggests that they exist to serve others.
One such service is reproduction. If women's sole permissible fulfillment in
life were reproduction, then it would follow that we should calculate
women's interest in not being excluded from work by determining the
impact of such exclusion on their offspring alone. Judge Coffey does just
that in his attempt to explain his use of disparate impact analysis, described
below.
Disparate impact analysis is the law's approach to employment policies
that appear neutral. Such policies do not explicitly discriminate based on
sex, race, or any other prohibited category, but their effect is de facto dis-
criminatory. One example is a written test, neutral on its face, which screens
out black job applicants at a significantly greater frequency than their white
counterparts. Under the Supreme Court's Title VII cases, such policies will
be upheld on the basis of a lesser showing by the employer than is required
in cases of direct differentiation, or disparate treatment. 126
Judge Coffey found that Johnson Controls's policy was neutral, citing
approvingly the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
which held that this sort of fetal protection policy was " 'neutral in the sense
that it effectively and equally protects the offspring of all employees.' "'
Rather than focus on the undeniably different way in which the policy
treated men and women, the court instead looked at how the policy treated
their unconceived offspring. This focus is remarkable because it ignores the
women as women. Only by conceiving of women as no more than potential
incubators, by devaluing their autonomous existence entirely, is it possible to
overlook the excluded employees and see only their potential offspring. 128
As if by sleight of hand, the court made the women themselves disappear,
reproduction context, in which such capacity might elevate women above men, we saw
that courts deny its existence. See, e.g., supra part IV.A.
126 Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1970) (disparate impact)
with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973) (disparate
treatment).
127 886 F.2d at 885 (quoting Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (1 1th
Cir. 1984)).
128 See MAcKINNON, supra note 4, at 24-25 (demonstrating that men value women
not as ends in themselves but as objects for their sexual use, citing the fact that
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and once they were gone, they could no longer be the victims of
discrimination.
Having decided to utilize disparate impact analysis, Judge Coffey set out
to demonstrate a substantial risk of harm to the fetus, the exposure of the
fetus to lead only through women and not men, and the lack of an equally
effective less restrictive alternative to exclusion." He limited the goals of
this demonstration, however, by declaring, "'It is not necessary to prove the
existence of a general consensus on the [first two issues] within the qualified
scientific community.' ,,a Here, the only scientists believed were Johnson
Controls's experts,13 ' people with an obvious bias in favor of the defense.
Though the plaintiffs' expert witnesses testified that animal studies showed
risks of genetic damage to the offspring of males exposed to lead, Judge Cof-
fey did not find this evidence convincing."2 What counted as a convincing
scientific fact was a controversial proposition which supported the exclusion
of women; science was "at best speculative"'" when it suggested that it
might be medically necessary to bar men as well.
Judge Easterbrook, in his dissent, challenged the supposedly scientific
conclusion that only women must stay away from lead to protect fetuses.
He noted that after extensive study, OSHA had "concluded that lead in men
as well as women is hazardous to the unborn,"' 4 and questioned the ability
of judges to dismiss these findings summarily without the aid of a trier of
fact. Justice Blackmun, writing the majority opinion for the Supreme Court,
reversed the court of appeals. He similarly rejected Judge Coffey's blanket
dismissal of scientific evidence of male reproductive harm resulting from
lead exposure. He noted critically, "Despite evidence in the record about
the debilitating effect of lead exposure on the male reproductive system,
Johnson Controls is concerned only with the harms that may befall the
unborn offspring of its female employees."'"
Judge Coffey's biased appeal to science is similar to the statements that life
begins at conception, that California law is "like nature itself," and, earlier
in Johnson Controls, that it was "medically necessary" to bar women from
certain jobs. These statements fail even to live up to science's own stan-
dards. By labeling a philosophical approach to life or law "science,"
"medicine," or "nature," and choosing one of many conflicting views in the
prostitution and modeling are the only two jobs for which women are paid more than
men).
129 See 886 F.2d at 888-90.
130 Id. at 888-89 (quoting Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1191 (4th Cir. 1982)).
'1 See id. at 888-90.
132 See id. at 889.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 918.
135 111 S. Ct. at 1203.
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scientific community as the legally correct one, judges flaunt their power to
convert what they choose to see into all that is there."x 6
Thus, Judge Coffey not only devalues women and their needs and justifies
women's punishment by an appeal to scientific authority, but he also utilizes
denial. In a telling analogy, he denies the fundamental connection between a
woman and her fetus during pregnancy. Judge Coffey concludes that even
under the analysis appropriate for facially discriminatory action, the chal-
lenged fetal protection policy would be upheld because safety is essential to
the business of making batteries and the policy directly relates to safety.137
Therefore, even blatant gender discrimination, which Judge Coffey does not
find here, may be justified by an underlying interest in fetal safety. To the
contention that women have a right to decide what risks to endure, Judge
Coffey responds that no one has the right to expose one's children to the risk
of serious harm, and that "[t]his situation is much like that involved in blood
transfusion cases. '
' as
Although there are similarities between the liberties asserted in Free Exer-
cise cases concerning the refusal of medical treatment for one's children and
the exposure of the unborn to lead, Judge Coffey fails to address a significant
difference. When a doctor gives blood to Christian Scientists' children, the
doctor does not affect the parents' physical autonomy; they are entities sepa-
rate from their children. By contrast, a fetal protection policy dictates to a
136 According to some feminists, this is true of the whole scientific enterprise. For
example, MacKinnon has declared that the posture of science, the non-situated distanced
standpoint, is a male approach to knowledge. Science is male in that men have
elaborated its criteria for verification, in that it objectifies that which it observes, and
finally, in that it constructs. truth from an interested standpoint while pretending
neutrality. MACKINNON, supra note 4, at 54. Sandra Harding similarly examined the
male perspective of science, and noted the sexist ends that science has served. See
SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM (1986). She observed that
"the cultural stereotype of science.., tough, rigorous, rational, impersonal, competitive
and unemotional-is inextricably intertwined with issues of men's gender identity. It
suggests that 'scientific' and 'masculine' are mutually reinforcing cultural constructs." Id.
at 63. Furthermore, Harding argued,
[S]cience is used in the service of sexist, racist, homophobic, and classist social
projects. Oppressive reproductive policies; white men's management of all women's
domestic labor; the stigmatization of, discrimination against, and medical 'cure' of
homosexuals; gender discrimination in workplaces-all these have been justified on
the basis of sexist research ....
Id. at 21.
137 Although Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act permits an employer to
discriminate explicitly on the basis of sex, religion, or national origin where any of these
traits is "a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1988), the
Supreme Court has held that this exception to the general prohibition against
discrimination is an "extremely narrow" one. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334
(1977).
138 886 F.2d at 897.
1992]
HeinOnline -- 72 B.U. L. Rev. 133 1992
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
woman what she can do, where she can go, whether and under what condi-
tions she can work, and ultimately how dependent she must be upon men for
her survival. This uniquely invasive quality is exacerbated when a policy is
applied broadly, as it was at Johnson Controls, to all women who cannot
prove sterility. Likening the right to work with the right to deprive a child
of blood transfusions is a persuasive comparison only in a world in which we
deny the features of women's reproduction that do not have analogues in the
male experience.
Judge Coffey's approach not only denies women's experiences, thereby
robbing women of personal autonomy, but it also fails to foster fetal welfare.
As one commentator has observed:
Mothers have a kind of automatic responsibility for their children....
[S]he must decide how to conduct herself and care for herself and the
child during pregnancy....
. . . To promote responsibility, we must focus . . . on the links
between responsibility, the need for freedom to act, and the circum-
stances under which parents will exercise this freedom.139
As Judge Easterbrook argued in his dissent, "No legal or ethical principle
compels or allows Johnson to assume that women are less able than men to
make intelligent decisions about the welfare of the next generation, [and]
that the interests of the next generation always trump the interests of living
woman."' 4 Moreover, the most responsible choice for a woman in this case
is unclear. As Judge Cudahy argued in his dissent, women's exclusion from
the workplace may conflict with the best interests of their future children:
this case ... demands ... some insight into social reality. What is the
situation of the pregnant woman, unemployed or working for the mini-
mum wage and unprotected by health insurance, in relation to her preg-
nant sister, exposed to an indeterminate lead risk but well-fed, housed
and doctored? Whose fetus is at greater risk? Whose decision is this to
make?14
In Judge Coffey's male-oriented world, a woman and her fetus are two
distinct individuals. Only in such a world of denial can "womanhood," as a
deviation from the prototypical qualified worker, "'undermine[ ]. .. [one's]
capacity to perform a job satisfactorily.' ,,4 A desire to punish women,
139 Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, supra note 4, at 322-23 (footnotes omitted).
140 886 F.2d at 913 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
141 886 F.2d at 902 (Cudahy, J., dissenting); see also Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood:
Feminist Theory and State Regulation of Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1325, 1337-43
(1990) (arguing that it would be productive to recognize the commonalities of interest
between mother and fetus).
11 886 F.2d at 898 (quoting Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 859
F.2d 1523, 1528 (7th Cir. 1988)); see MINOW, supra note 4, at 58 (discussing the model
worker conceived of as "the traditional male employee who has a full-time wife and
mother to care for his home and children").
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independent of any desire to protect fetuses, explains the belief that it is
appropriate to treat a mother and her fetus as adversaries and to control the
former to protect the latter.
4 3
As discussed in connection with the Davis opinions, although different
judges may reason differently and arrive at different conclusions, they none-
theless may share the use of rhetoric that denies, devalues, or punishes
women. Judge Posner's dissenting opinion in Johnson Controls also illus-
trates this phenomenon. According to Judge Posner, the factual record in
the case required further development by a trial court to determine whether
sex was indeed a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).'4 If sex were
a BFOQ, then Judge Posner would have been willing to uphold the policy,
notwithstanding its discriminatory effect."
In his analysis of the facts, Judge Posner, like Judge Coffey, devalues
women for their capacity to become pregnant, by uncritically accepting a
workplace that harms them. Judge Posner counts concern about fetuses
among the considerations that inform bona fide exclusion. Indeed, he says,
"To confine the occupational qualification defense to concerns with price
and product quality would deny a defense to Johnson Controls even if the
company excluded only pregnant women."' 46 Judge Posner implicitly
assumes that pregnant women are certainly unqualified to work in a factory
filled with lead. He fails to consider condemning a workplace which is dan-
gerous to women experiencing a regular, normal part of female life, because
normal parts of female life are not considered the norm. Thus, for Judge
Posner, designing a workplace that does not interfere with these normal
experiences in women's lives is termed "an accommodation for pregnant or
potentially pregnant workers.'
147
143 One commentator has argued that a pregnant woman is in the best position to look
after her fetus, by virtue of her connection to it, and that the law should therefore
privilege her with decisionmaking power rather than penalize her for this connection.
See Note, supra note 141, at 1340. The author has noted also that the willingness to
regulate a pregnant woman-in the context of fetal endangerment laws regarding drug
and alcohol use during pregnancy-is inconsistent with the law's general reluctance to
interfere with family relationships or to remove children from their parents' homes. See
id. at 1337; see also Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, supra note 4, at 322-23 (arguing
that because of a mother's connection to her fetus, we must give her the freedom to act if
we are to encourage the benevolent use of that inherent responsibility).
144 886 F.2d at 903, 908 (Posner, J., dissenting).
145 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988).
146 886 F.2d at 904 (Posner, J., dissenting).
147 Id. (emphasis added). But see MINow, supra note 4, at 58 ("The very phrase
'special treatment,' when used to describe pregnancy or maternity leave, posits men as the
norm and women as different or deviant from that norm."); Nadine Taub & Wendy W.
Williams, Will Equality Require More than Assimilation, Accommodation or Separation
from the Existing Social Structure?, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 825, 829-30 (1985) (arguing for
gender neutrality despite the retort of critics that such neutrality masks the fact that "in a
workplace whose rules and patterns are based on an assumption that the standard worker
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Judge Posner also devalues women by unflatteringly characterizing their
reproductive conduct and by denying the realities which generate this con-
duct. In defense of fetal protection policies that apply to women who are not
pregnant, Judge Posner relies upon the belief that many women become
pregnant negligently even though they work in lead-contaminated environ-
ments and even though they have been warned. "[T]here are many careless
pregnancies, as is shown by the frequency of abortion and of illegitimate
birth ....
Judge Posner fails to understand that "illegitimate" births are not neces-
sarily "careless," or even unintentional. Like Justice Scalia in Michael H. ,
however, Judge Posner seems to consider the traditional family the only
desirable context for procreation. Moreover, women who have experienced
a truly unwanted pregnancy would be unlikely to characterize this event as
"careless." Perhaps the high abortion rate reflects not women's failure to
care enough to avoid undesired pregnancy, but rather the involuntariness of
sexual relations for women.15°
Later in his dissent, Judge Posner denies a woman's unique connection to
her fetus, making an argument similar to Judge Coffey's blood transfusion
analogy. Judge Posner asks that we "not be deceived by superficial historical
analogies or facile invocations of [the term] 'paternalistic.' "151 He argues
that while laws that hurt women in the past were based on protecting their
fitness to reproduce, fetal protection policies are only superficially similar, in
part because a fetus "is a different person (or proto-person) from its
has no primary parental obligations, the woman who still carries that burden herself, as
the average woman does, faces serious and continuing obstacles to her workforce
participation").
14s 886 F.2d at 906 (Posner, J., dissenting).
149 See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
1o Catharine MacKinnon has stated:
I wonder if a woman can be presumed to control access to her sexuality if she feels
unable to interrupt intercourse to insert a diaphragm; or worse, cannot even want to,
aware that she risks a pregnancy she knows she does not want. Do you think she
would stop the man for any other reason, such as, for instance, the real taboo-lack
of desire? If she would not, how is sex, hence its consequences, meaningfully
voluntary for women?... Sex doesn't look a whole lot like freedom when it appears
normatively less costly for women to risk an undesired, often painful, traumatic,
dangerous, sometimes illegal, and potentially life-threatening procedure than to
protect themselves in advance.
MACKINNON, supra note 4, at 95. Support for the link between coercive sexual exper-
iences and the later failure to use contraceptives has emerged in a study of teenage preg-
nancy. The study found a significant correlation between childhood sexual abuse and
teen pregnancy. One researcher explained that "[y]oung people who have been abused
just don't see themselves in situations where they can take control over their bodies or
over contraception." Alison Bass, Study Ties Teen-age Pregnancy, Childhood Sex Abuse,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 25, 1992, at 1, 4 (quoting Debra Boyer, a cultural anthropologist at
the University of Washington).
151 886 F.2d at 906 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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mother."' 52 This argument misconceives pregnancy both by dismissing the
similarities between old protectionist legislation prohibiting women from
working and the Johnson Controls policy, and by characterizing a woman
and her fetus as two separate beings.
First, Judge Posner mistakenly distinguishes the two types of rules. The
protectionist rules, he posits, excluded women from the workplace or limited
their available hours (and thereby accomplished virtually the same result) in
order to ensure their fitness for reproduction."5 Policies like that of Johnson
Controls, he suggests, are designed to protect the fetus rather than the
woman's reproductive ability."5 The Johnson Controls policy, however, like
the protectionist rules, attempted to ensure that fertile women would be
ready to produce healthy offspring at any time. Both rules circumscribed
what women could do for the sake of hypothetical offspring they might have.
In other words, both rules treated women as little more than potential incu-
bators. And both rules took the contemporary workplace as inevitable.
Women whose potential children were in danger therefore had to leave.
Second, Judge Posner erroneously speaks of a fetus who inhabits the
inside of a woman's body as a "different person (or proto-person)" from her,
as though one could address the fetus separately from the mother. As one
commentator has argued, "[C]haracterization of the maternal-fetal relation-
ship as one of conflicting rights denies the physical and social context of
pregnancy and undermines the importance of connection between the
mother and the fetus."'" It is not surprising that Judge Posner uses the
exclusively male pronoun to say, "A paternalistic measure is one that pro-
tects a person against him self."'" In a world where the prototypical human
being is male and no persons are connected to other persons, it is incoherent
to suggest that limiting a woman's freedom in order to protect her child
constitutes paternalism.
Judge Posner's opinion utilizes the denial strategy in one final context: He
denies the emotional pain of excluded women. Since emotionality is a trait
linked to women and their nurturing qualities, this denial is another slight to
women as nurturers, just as the omission of nurturing in Michael H. deval-
ues the nurturing aspect of women's lives. Judge Posner states that if, as
a result of tort liability, the cost of employing women were to render the
battery business inviable, "[t]he plaintiffs would have won a Pyrrhic vic-
tory .... If Johnson Controls terminated its battery operation as a result of
this suit, the plaintiffs would be in the same position as if the occupational
152 Id.
153 See id. (citing Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1908)).
154 See id.
155 Note, supra note 141, at 1337.
156 886 F.2d at 906 (Posner, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). For an analysis of
language and its relationship to gender, see Sally McConnell-Ginet, Difference and
Language: A Linguist's Perspective, in THE FUTURE OF DIFFERENCE 157-66 (Hester
Eisenstein & Alice Jardine eds., 1985), cited in Frug, supra note 54, at 1094.
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qualification defense had prevailed except that they might.., recover attor-
ney's fees.' 1 7 From a woman's perspective, however, these situations would
not be the same. Being excluded because one is female is not the same as
losing one's job because a court has held that a business which cannot exist
without discriminating against women cannot exist at all."s The latter
result is empowering. It communicates the message that women matter
more than the operation of business as usual. It has the potential to generate
real change in market priorities because it forces companies to internalize
the costs of excluding women. The former result does just the opposite; it
tells women that their needs are secondary and that their exclusion is just a
cost of doing business, a cost that is theirs alone to bear.
On March 20, 1991, in the final act of the Johnson Controls legal drama,
the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals."5 9 In an
opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Court held that fetal protection did not
constitute a BFOQ under Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
Because there was no evidence that fertile women performed their jobs at
Johnson Controls less well than their male or sterile female counterparts, the
Court held that the protection policy was illegal. Although the decision to
invalidate Johnson Controls's policy was unanimous, Justice White, in a nar-
row concurrence in the judgment joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice Kennedy, took the position that some fetal protection policies might
survive Title VII scrutiny. Justice White wrote that "a fetal protection pol-
icy would be justified... if, for example, an employer could show that exclu-
sion of women from certain jobs was reasonably necessary to avoid
substantial tort liability."'' 1
Although the Supreme Court's substantive decision obviously will have a
much larger significance than the Seventh Circuit's decision did, the court of
appeals' use of such rhetorical devices as science, nature, denial, devaluation,
and punishment is more clearly evident than is the use of those techniques
by the Supreme Court, which focuses on the statutory meaning of Title VII.
The court of appeals opinions thus contain stronger evidence that judicial
rhetoric can and does disempower women. The opinions in the Supreme
Court, particularly that of Justice White, however, do merit brief explora-
tion. The underlying assumption of Justice White's concurrence, like that of
the opinions of Judges Coffey and Posner, is that a safe workplace may in
some instances preclude the presence of women. Such an assumption can
only be valid if we take the workplace, as it is, to be inevitable. Because "the
157 886 F.2d at 907 (Posner, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
158 Cf Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(using similar language to describe a society which justifies the violation of individual
rights by an appeal to the need for effective law enforcement: "To declare that in the
administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means ... would bring terrible
retribution.").
159 See 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
160 Id. at 1210 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
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market was constructed primarily by men, and the roles available in the
market as well as the rewards associated with those roles were created in a
sexist and discriminatory environment,"'' it is not legitimate to take today's
work environment as given. In fact, it seems inherently wrong to tolerate a
workplace which is unsafe and unaccommodating for half of the population.
To accept such a status quo devalues women and punishes them in the guise
of the humane treatment of fetuses.
Both women and their children have an interest in nondiscriminatory
employment as well as in a safe workplace. If the two interests conflict, it is
appropriate that employers internalize the costs of discrimination and of
fetal risk. Only in this way will the industry have a true incentive to make
the workplace safe for all. Only by requiring employers to internalize both
safety and discrimination costs is there a chance that the market will truly
consider all the consequences of its behavior.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the denial, devaluation, and punishment relat-
ing to female reproductive capacity that can be found in judicial rhetoric and
sometimes in judicial decisions as well. The discussion has demonstrated
that science, the "neutral" observer, and nature, the writer of human
destiny, are liberally employed in the service of this reactive rhetoric.
Michael H. illustrated that a court can define paternal uncertainty out of
existence through the manipulative use of the term "father," while simulta-
neously devaluing the nurturing of children in which women socially and
biologically participate. Davis 1 and Davis 2 featured the denial of preg-
nancy's essentiality to reproduction and the denial of the unique burdens it
imposes upon women. Finally, Johnson Controls, particularly at the court of
appeals, illustrated the interplay between the mechanisms. The court's
denial of women's unique relationship of connection to their fetuses, devalu-
ation of women by considering them no more than producers of offspring,
acceptance of the workplace as given, and understatement of the costs of
excluding women together facilitated women's "scientifically necessary"
punishment for their capacity to become pregnant.
This Article has posed the hypothesis that such rhetoric responds to the
psychological phenomenon of fetus-envy. If this is correct, the male judges
who exploit language in the ways here described feel threatened by women
and the attributes that elevate women's significance and control over that of
men in the reproductive sphere. To cope with such a threat, male judges can
pretend it is not there. The phrase, "life begins at conception," for example,
so widely used in public debate about abortion that it has acquired a surface
legitimacy, is quintessentially the denial of pregnancy. Male judges can also
devalue that which they do not have. Finally, male judges can punish: they
have the pen and the power to convert a woman's fertile womb into an
161 Olsen, supra note 118, at 1548.
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instrument of her subjugation, her control over human reproduction into
enslavement of her body to the perceived welfare of future generations.
Fetus-envy may be one example of the larger truth that at the root of injus-
tice lies the self-doubt of the powerful.
The foregoing analysis is not an indictment of all men or of all male
judges. Indeed, in Johnson Controls, Judge Easterbrook and Justice Black-
mun expressly rejected the anti-female rhetorical devices used by other
judges. For example, Judge Easterbrook showed sensitivity to women's per-
spectives in his response to the argument that employing women in a battery
factory can be very costly if future offspring sue. In such a case, the argu-
ment runs, it is rational to discriminate. Judge Easterbrook's response was
that "Title VII applies even when--especially when-discrimination is
rational as the employer sees things."' 6' 2 Although he did not go so far as to
recognize that rationality reflects entrenched sexism,"c he exhibited insight
into the differing plights of men and women when he stated that discrimina-
tion is most certainly occurring when its commission appears rational to the
actor.
This exploration of judicial rhetoric attempts to raise the consciousness of
those who read judicial opinions, of those who write them, and of those
whose lives are influenced by them. The disempowering mechanisms
described here frequently operate at a subconscious level and can be elimi-
nated with awareness. As to those judges who deliberately manipulate
images of women to obscure intentional disempowerment, their pretense is
exposed, rendering their work more difficult and less damaging to women
and to those who care about women's lives.
162 886 F.2d at 914 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
163 See, e.g., Scales, supra note 4 (arguing that the more "rational" the discrimination
appears, the more suspicious it should be).
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